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Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance 
 
Cynthia A. Williams 
Osler Chair in Business Law 
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Chapter for OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE  
(Jeff Gordon & Georg Ringe, eds., forthcoming) 
 
Abstract 
Corporate social responsibility has become a subject of growing importance in business and law.  
Today, no analysis of corporate governance systems would be complete without considering the 
pressures on companies to be seen as responsible corporate citizens.  This chapter first provides a 
descriptive overview of developments in the field, including increasing voluntary and required 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure; and proliferating voluntary and 
multilateral standards for responsible corporate behavior.  This chapter then reviews some of the 
more significant empirical evidence on the financial results of companies’ implementation of 
corporate responsibility initiatives, including the effects of such initiatives on innovation, trust, 
and social welfare.  It concludes with an analysis relating these developments to arguments over 




Corporate social responsibility is a topic that has been given increased attention in the last 
two decades in practice and in theory, both in management and law.  Defined in an influential  
1970’s  article as “the firm’s considerations of, and response to, issues beyond the . . . economic, 
technical, and legal requirements of the firm to accomplish social benefits along with the 
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traditional economic gains which the firm seeks,”1 the European Commission more simply 
defined it in 2011 as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society.”2    As the  
Commission stated in adopting that definition, “[e]nterprises should have in place a process to 
integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights and consumer concerns into their business 
operations and core strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders.”3  Thus, the emphasis 
has shifted from philanthropy and attention to corporate action “beyond law,” to an inquiry into 
how a company conducts its business.  Indicative of this shift, many academics and practitioners 
in management now refer to the topic as corporate responsibility, not corporate social 
responsibility, as will this author.4    
 What is some evidence of a developing norm of corporate responsibility?  Few global 
companies today fail to highlight their social initiatives and performance on their websites, while 
over 90% of the Global 250 companies voluntarily disclose more environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) information than required by law.5 Voluntary, transnational standards of best 
social and environmental practices are proliferating in virtually every industry, many with 
associated certification schemes and requirements for third-party attestation or auditing.6  These 
voluntary initiatives are increasingly being supplemented by domestic and multilateral 
government actions to encourage, or in some cases require, companies to pay closer attention to 
1 Keith Davis, The Case For and Against Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities, 16  AM. MNGMT. J. 312, 
312 (1973). 
2 European Commission, A Renewed European Union Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM 
(2011) 681, ¶ 3.1. 
3  See id. 
4 See Céline Gainet, Exploring the Impact of legal Systems and Financial Structures on CR, 95 J. BUS. ETHICS 195, 
197 (2010)(discussing shift in nomenclature from “corporate social responsibility” to “corporate responsibility,” for, 
among other reasons, encompassing the concept of both social and environmental responsibilities in a  single term).   
5 See KPMG, The KPMG Survey of CR Reporting 2013, available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/corporate-
responsibility/Documents/corporate-responsibility-reporting-survey-2013-exec-summary.pdf . 
6 See Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance Services in Global 
Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325 (2008). 
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the social and environmental consequences of their actions and to disclose more information 
about those consequences.7   
Investors as well have become more attentive in recent years to environmental and social 
risks in portfolio companies, and therefore more concerned with corporate responsibility.  Global 
assets under management with sustainability screens have risen 61% since 2012, to US$ 21.4 
trillion at the start of 2014.8   Institutions managing US$ 45 trillion of invested capital have 
committed to the U.N. Environment Program’s Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), 
which require investors to incorporate ESG issues into investment practices across their asset 
classes.9 And, as of 2015, over US$ 92 trillion of the world’s invested capital backs the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) ’s work with 2,000 companies around the world to gather data on those 
companies’ greenhouse gas emissions.10  These data are then provided to Bloomberg for 
incorporation with other ESG data that Bloomberg now sells, since 2009, to investors around the 
world.11   Indeed, corporate responsibility itself has become an industry, one a critical NGO 
noted has London “awash with PR consultants, social auditors, firms providing verification or 
‘assurance’ for companies’ social and environmental reports, and bespoke investment analysts all 
vying for business.”12 
  While these trends indicate that corporate responsibility has achieved some place within 
mainstream corporate and investor activities, that place is deeply contested, in both theory and 
7 See Parts II, B, 2 and  III , infra. 
8  Global Sustainable Investment Alliance,  The Global Sustainable Investment Review 2014, available at 
www.sustainabilityHQ.com. 
9  United Nations Environment Program Principles for Responsible Investment, available at 
http://www.unpri.org/about-pri. 
10 Carbon Disclosure Project, Catalyzing Business and Government Action, available at http://www.cdp.net/en-
US/Pages/About-Us.aspx. 
11 See Table 3, infra, for a summary of the environmental and social data that Bloomberg now sells to its broker and 
dealer clients. 
12 Christian Aid, Behind the Mask: The Real Face of Corporate Social Responsibility 8 (2004). 
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practice.  Everything from the history of corporate responsibility, its importance, its effects, and 
its legitimacy is subject to challenge, depending on the underlying corporate governance system 
of a country in question, how countries arrange their social welfare provision, the relationship of 
the state to the market, and even the theory of the nature of the corporation one holds.  In 
important respects corporate responsibility is both too strong and too weak: too strong an 
assertion of a social role for the corporation and its directors to coexist comfortably with the  
view of the purely economic role of the corporation within shareholder-focused corporate 
governance systems, and yet too weak for academics taking a stakeholder view of the 
corporation who are concerned with global problems they view companies as having helped to 
create, including climate change, environmental degradation, exploitative labor conditions and 
worsening economic inequality.   
This chapter will proceed as follows.  Part 2 will describe voluntary corporate responsibility 
initiatives, followed in Part 3 by some of the more significant legal developments on the topic.  
Part 4 will discuss empirical evidence about the financial and social effects of corporate 
responsibility, including interactions with corporate governance structures.  Part 5 will evaluate 
these corporate responsibility trends, and Part 6 will conclude.     
II.   VOLUNTARY CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY INITIATIVES 
A.  Corporate Responsibility Reporting                      
The clearest demonstration of the evolution of corporate responsibility from academic theory  
to mainstream business practice is in the trends with respect to corporate reporting of 
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environmental, social and governance (ESG) information.13 While some jurisdictions are starting 
to require ESG reporting (as described below), much of this reporting is still voluntary.  It can 
thus be interpreted as an indication of companies’ perceptions of the social expectations of 
business, even as companies seek to manage those expectations through their corporate 
responsibility reporting.14   
The most comprehensive source of data on ESG reporting is that done by KPMG in the 
Netherlands.  KPMG published its first ESG report in 1993, and its most recent in 2013.  In 
1993, 12% of the top 100 companies in the OECD countries (ex. Japan) published an 
environmental or social report.15  By 2013, 76% of the top 100 companies in the Americas 
publish a separate corporate responsibility report, as do 73% of top 100 companies in Europe and 
71% in Asia.16 Of the largest 250 companies globally, reporting rates are 93%.17  The Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI)’s voluntary, multi-stakeholder framework for ESG reporting has 
emerged as the clear global benchmark: 78% of reporting companies worldwide and 82% of the 
Global 250 use GRI as the basis for their corporate responsibility reporting.18 Of particular note, 
13 For an excellent overview of the evolution of corporate responsibility as an academic theory in the management 
literature, see  Archie V. Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct, 38 BUS. & 
SOC’TY 268 (1999). 
14 See Sara B. Feldner & Kati T. Berg, How Corporations Manage Industry and consumer Expectations via the CR 
Report, 8(3) PUBLIC RELATIONS J. (2014),  available at www.prsa.org/prjournal; Ronen Shamir, The De-
Radicalization of Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY 669, 675 (2004). 
15 See Ans Kolk, A Decade of Sustainability Reporting: Developments and Significance, 3 INT’L J. ENVIRONMENT &  
SUSTAINABLE DEVEL. 51, 52 Figure 1 (2004).  KPMG has changed the format of the report since its original 1993 
report on corporate responsibility reporting, so direct comparisons are not possible between the Global 250 in 1993 
and the Global 250 in 2013. 
16 KPMG, The KPMG Survey of CR Reporting 2013, at 10,  available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/corporate-
responsibility/Documents/corporate-responsibility-reporting-survey-2013-exec-summary.pdf (last visited March 5, 
2015). 
17 See id. 
18 See id.at 11.  The Global Reporting Initiative is now in its fourth iteration.  It has been developed by, and is used 
by, thousands of companies, governments, and non-profit entities around the world to report on the economic, 




                                                          
slightly over half (59%) of the Global 250 now have their reports “assured,” most often (two-
thirds of the time) by the specialist bureaus of the major accountancy firms.19 
In addition to the quantity of corporate responsibility reporting, KPMG also evaluates the 
quality of reporting.  Here, European companies generally do substantially better than those in 
Asia or the Americas (average quality scores of 71 out of 100 in Europe versus 54 for companies 
in the Americas and 50 in Asia Pacific).20  Within the Global 250, companies are starting to see 
more opportunities than risks from social and environmental factors, such as for the development 
of new products and services.  Eighty-seven percent of the Global 250 identify climate change, 
material resource scarcity and trends in energy and fuel as “megatrends” that will affect their 
business.21  Ultimately KPMG concludes that “[m]any companies no longer see corporate 
responsibility as a moral issue, but as core business risks and opportunities.”22  This conclusion 
is consistent with the views of prominent management academics Michael Porter and Mark 
Kramer,23 and Abagail McWilliams and Donald Siegel,24 each of whom (among others) has 
argued for companies to use corporate responsibility initiatives as part of their business strategies 
to promote competitive advantage.   
B.  Substantive Corporate Responsibility Initiatives 
1.  Private Initiatives 
19 See KPMG 2013 Report, supra  note 16, at 11. 
20 See id. at 14. 
21 See id. at 14-15. 
22  See id. at 15. 
23   See  Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage and 
Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV. 78 ( DEC. 2006). 
24 See Abagail McWilliams & Donald S. Siegel, Creating and Capturing Value: Strategic Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Resource-Based Theory, and Sustainable Competitive Advantage, 37 J. OF MANGMT.  1480 (2011). 
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The focus on expanded ESG disclosure has occurred concomitantly with the proliferation of 
transnational, voluntary standards for what constitutes responsible corporate action.  Thus, over 
the past two decades such standards have been developed by states; public/private partnerships; 
multi-stakeholder negotiation processes; industries and companies; institutional investors; 
functional groups such as accountancy firms and social assurance consulting groups (many of 
which did not exist more than ten years ago); NGOs; and non-financial ratings agencies.25  
Standards have been developed in just about every industry, from apparel26 to chemicals,27 
extractives such as oil, gas and minerals28 to conflict-free diamonds;29 sustainable fisheries30 and 
forestry;31 project finance32 and fair-trade goods such as coffee, tea, cocoa and cotton,33 to name 
just a few examples.   Thousands of individual companies have adopted voluntary codes of 
conduct establishing standards for responsible behavior, and some companies then engage third-
25 See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005).  The implications of these standards for theories of corporate governance, regulation, 
and economic development are profound, some of which the author has explored in prior work.  See Cynthia A. 
Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value 
Construct, 38 CORN. INT’L. J. J. 493(2005).   
26 See, e.g., The Fair Labor Associations, http://www.FLA.org, or the Workers’ Rights Consortium, 
http://www.workersrights.org.  For a discussion of these and other standards for the global supply chain in the 
apparel industry, see Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Non-Governmental Systems of Labor 
Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 1 (2003).  
27 See Responsible Care, http://www.canadianchemistry.ca/responsible_care/index.php/en/responsible-care-history;  
Jean M. Belanger, Responsible Care in Canada: The Evolution of an Ethic and a Commitment, 27 CHEM. INT’L 2 
(March-April) 2005.  The standards developed for responsible industrial chemicals production are in place in over 
60 countries, as of 2015, and now include greenhouse gas reporting and assurance.   
28 See The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, available at http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org. 
29 See The Kimberly Process, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com. 
30   See, e.g., the Marine Stewardship Council certification process, http://www.msc.org. 
31  See Forest Stewardship Council: Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship, available at http://www.fsc.org. 
Competition between the forest standards  promulgated by business versus those promulgated by NGOs has been 
extensively studied by leading students of regulation and political theory.  See  BENJAMIN CASHORE, GRAEME AULD 
& DEANNA NEWSOM, GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON-
STATE AUTHORITY (Yale Univ. Press 2004);   Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public 
Regulation: the Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. OF INT’L LAW 47, 51 (2006).   
32 See The Equator Principles, http://www.equator-principles.com.  See also John M. Conley & Cynthia A. 
Williams, Global Banks as Global Sustainability Regulators: The Equator Principles, 33:4 J. L. & POLICY REV. 542 
(2011). 
33   See http://www.fairtrade.net/certification_mark.html for an overview of the fair trade requirements. 
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party certifiers to ensure that their suppliers and subsidiaries are meeting those standards.34  
Multi-sector codes have also been developed with standards that are designed to apply across 
industries.  Of particular note here is Social Accountability 8000, which is based on the 
International Labor Organization (ILO)’s Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,35 but adds 
a commitment to a living wage, and a commitment to compliance with U.N. international human 
rights protections.36  SA 8000 also includes a requirement for independent monitoring of code 
compliance prior to certification that specific productive facilities meet the SA8000 standards.     
Another multi-sector example is the Ethical Trading Institute, which is a London-based tri-partite 
labor, industry and NGO organization working to incorporate ILO protections into supply chains 
for products bound for the Western markets.37  ETI works in a deliberative fashion, using 
monitoring, evaluation and on-going learning to both improve standards for the 9.8 million 
people incorporated into the 70 companies’ supply chains (as of 2015), but also to teach workers 
their rights and how to advocate for them independently.38 
2.  Multilateral Initiatives 
A number of significant multilateral instruments have also been developed or recently 
strengthened by organizations comprised of government representatives.  While these 
instruments do not establish binding treaty obligations, they do articulate governments’ 
34   See Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance Services in Global 
Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325 (2008).  The University of Minnesota Law School, under the leadership of 
international human rights scholar Prof. David Weissbrodt, has an extensive collection of human rights materials on-
line, including copies of hundreds of firms’ codes of conduct.  See 
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/business/codes.html.    
35 The International Labour Organization’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
focusses on four core rights: freedom of association and rights to collective bargaining, freedom from forced labor 
or prison labor, freedom from child labor exploitation and non-discrimination.  See International Labour 
Organization, available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm. 
36 See Social Accountability 8000, available at http://www.sa-intl.org. 
37 See Ethical Trading Initiative, available at http://www.ethicaltrade.org. 




                                                          
expectations of responsible corporate action.  Four are of particular note:  the OECD’s 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; the ISO 26,000 Corporate Responsibility standards; the 
U.N.’s Global Compact; and the U.N.’s more recent “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework 
articulating states’ and companies’ human rights responsibilities.   
The OECD’s Guidelines, initially promulgated in 1976 and most recently amended in 2011, 
encourage companies to promote sustainable development, and include standards based on ILO 
and U.N. treaty obligations, including standards of transparency, labor protection, international 
human rights protection, responsible supply chain management, environmental protection, anti-
bribery standards and fair tax contributions (added in 2011 and unique among international 
corporate responsibility standards).39  A number of aspects of the OECD approach are of 
particular importance.  First, the standards are developed through tri-partite participation of 
governments (through the OECD itself), business (the Business and Industry Advisory 
Committee to the OECD) and labor (the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD).  This 
approach is typical of the “social partners” view of economic life in Europe.  Second, the OECD 
is starting to develop sector-specific guidance for responsible business conduct in a number of 
areas:  agricultural supply chains, financial sector due diligence, textile and garment supply 
chains, extractive sector stakeholder engagement and mineral supply chains.  Third, the OECD 
countries, which include most of the developed economies (excepting Brazil, Russia, India and 
China), all commit to establish National Contact Points (NCPs) to whom  challenges may be 
brought where individuals feel their OECD rights have been violated.  Labor, in particular, has 
39 See Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate.mne. 
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been proactive in using these NCPs to address violations, and by so doing a record of global 
labor rights and responsibilities is slowly being developed.40 
The International Standards Organization (ISO), which has developed thousands of technical 
standards since its establishment after World War II, developed the ISO 26,000 standard for 
corporate responsibility in 2010, after five years of consultation among standards bodies.41  
Unlike most of its standards, against which certification can occur, ISO 26,000 is not a standard 
to provide guidance for certification.  It does, however, provide a useful definition of corporate 
responsibility:   
CSR is the responsibility of an organization for the impacts of its decisions and activities on 
society and the environment, through transparent and ethical behavior that contributes to 
sustainable development, including health and the welfare of society, takes into account the 
expectations of stakeholders, is in compliance with applicable laws and with international 
norms of behavior, and is integrated throughout the organization and practiced in its 
relationships.42   
 ISO 26,000 is important as evidence of the developing global norm of corporate responsibility: 
developed with representation from 90 countries and 40 international or regional organizations, it 
was drafted with input from consumers, governments, industry, labor, NGOs and “service, 
support, research, academics and others,”43 and so can credibly claim to represent a global 
consensus about companies’ social responsibilities.  To read the specific standards one must buy 
them (somewhat ironic where one responsibility principle is transparency, but an apparently 
successful business model), but an outline of the topics is available.  ISO 26,0000 defines general 
principles of accountability, transparency, ethical behavior, respect for stakeholder interests, for 
40 See John Evans, Organizing  workers globally: the need for public policy to regulate investment, in THE 
EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM (Cynthia A. Williams and Peer 
Zumbansen, eds.)(Cambridge Univ. Press 2011), at 343-353. 
41 See ISO 26,000-Social Responsibility, available at http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm. 
42 See id.  
43 See id. 
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rule of law, for international norms and human rights as the field of corporate responsibility; and 
core subjects include governance, human rights, labor practices, the environment, fair operating 
practices, consumer issues, and community involvement.44    
The United Nations began its work on corporate responsibility in 2000 under Secretary 
General Kofi Annan with the Global Compact, a policy initiative in which businesses commit to 
respect ten principles that cover four areas of concern (international human rights, labor 
protection, environmental protection, and anti-corruption).45  By 2015, 12,000 businesses, 
academic institutions, and NGOs in 140 countries had signed onto the Global Compact.  
Governance efforts are underway to make corporate commitments to the Global Compact 
framework meaningful, including requirements for participants to communicate annually on their 
progress regarding the four areas of concern.  Still, by 2008 close to 15% of companies had been 
de-listed from the Global Compact for failing to report on their progress, and the Global 
Compact continues to be criticized for its lack of specificity.46     
Among multilateral frameworks, the U.N.’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, adopted by the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2011, seems to have the greatest potential 
to develop into a baseline global legal framework for companies’ social responsibilities.  (The 
OECD Principles only apply to companies in or from adhering countries.) The U.N. Guiding 
Principles set out the core spheres of obligation for states and companies with respect to human 
rights: states have the duty to protect their citizens from violations by third parties, including 
companies, by promulgating laws and regulations; companies have the responsibility to act with 
44 See Guidance on ISO 26,0000, available at  https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:26000:ed-1:v1:en:sec:A.  
45 See U.N. Global Compact Annual Review 2010, available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/UNGC_Annual_Review_2010.pdf. 
46 See Jette Steen Knudsen, Which Companies Benefit Most from U.N. Global Compact Membership?, available at   
http://www.EuropeanBusinessReview.com/?p=3167 (citing statistics, and asserting that the Global Compact is 
primarily useful for large companies to fill a governance void as they operate in less developed countries). 
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due diligence to respect citizens’ human rights; and both have the duty to provide access to 
remedies for victims. Developed after the failure in 2004 of the U.N. Human Right’s 
Commission’s Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, which “business vehemently opposed,”47 the 
Protect, Respect, and Remedy framework was developed in a six-year process led by Prof. John 
Ruggie of Harvard University.  The international human rights obligations applicable to 
companies through the Guiding Principles include those in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and the Core Conventions of the ILO.48    The state duty to protect human rights 
is now being incorporated into many European and other countries by the establishment of 
National Action Plans to disseminate and implement the Guiding Principles.49 At the same time, 
an NGO called the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, supported by the UK and 
German governments, has launched a ranking of companies’ human rights records in response to 
the Guiding Principles.50  The combination of global standards supported by and being 
implemented by a broad array of governments, a standards-development process that was 
inclusive, transparent and well-balanced between companies, labor and NGOs, and a dedicated 
NGO collecting data and publicizing it, gives the U.N. Guiding Principles the potential to 
become the de facto global corporate responsibility standard.  
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
47 See U.N. Guiding Principles, available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-
materials/Ruggie-protect-respect-remedy-framework.pdf. 
48 See id. 
49 See Guidelines for the U.N. Guiding Principles, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx. 




                                                          
For the most part, corporate responsibility standards are voluntary, with the exception of new 
legislation in India, which has required companies to establish a corporate responsibility 
committee of the board and contribute 2% of net profits to corporate responsibility initiatives as 
of 2014,51 building upon strong cultural foundations for the social obligations of successful 
companies (and people) in India.52  That said, many of the topics that corporate responsibility 
addresses are subject to domestic regulation, such as labor rights, environmental protection, 
consumer protection, anti-discrimination or anti-bribery.  And these regulatory standards have 
implications for the degree to which voluntary corporate responsibility initiatives are necessary 
to fill important gaps, either in a domestic or transnational context.  As has been argued by Dirk 
Matten and Jeremy Moon, in countries with stakeholder corporate governance systems and more 
expansive social welfare arrangements, corporate responsibility is “implicit” in doing business 
according to law, so companies do not need to be as “explicit” about taking on social 
responsibilities, as do leading companies in more shareholder-oriented countries.53  As will be 
discussed below, recent empirical evidence suggests that these underlying regulatory standards 
effectively shape the sustainability culture within countries, and have both a strong effect on how 
companies handle corporate responsibility issues and a strong effect on the sustainability 
51 See Price Waterhouse Coopers, Handbook on Corporate Social Responsibility in India, available at 
http://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications/2013/handbook-on-corporate-social-responsibility-in-india.pdf. 
52 See Peter Cappelli, Harbir Singh, Jitendra Singh & Micael Useem, The India Way: Lessons for the U.S., 24 ACAD. 
MNGMT. PERSPECTIVES 6 (2010)(arguing that business managers in India eschew explicit concern with shareholder 
value, but invest in employee training, employee empowerment, and a social mission, leading to strong growth and 
successful companies).   The Tata Steel Company is one example, among many, of companies with extensive 
community social responsibility and employee welfare and training initiatives going back over a century.  See 
http://www.tatasteel.com/corporate/heritage/a-century-of-trust.asp.   
53 See Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, “Implicit” and “explicit” CSR: A conceptual framework for a comparative  
understanding of corporate social responsibility, 33:2 ACAD. MNGMT. REV.  404 (2008).  
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outcomes at the country level.54  To the extent that governments have regulated corporate 
responsibility per se, though, such regulation is focused on disclosure. 
By 2015, many European countries or their stock exchanges, and the EU itself, require some 
environmental or social disclosure, to varying degrees of specificity.55  The EU’s requirement is 
a directive that entered into force on 6 December 2014; member states will need to transpose it 
into national legislation within two years.56 It will require approximately 6,000 large companies 
and “public interest organizations,” such as banks and insurance companies, to “prepare a non-
financial statement containing information relating to at least environmental matters, social and 
employee-related matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters.”57  This 
requirement builds upon EU accounting rules (the EU Accounts Modernization Directive) that 
have, since 2003, required companies to report on environmental and labor issues “to the extent 
necessary” to provide investors with an accurate view of the company’s financial position and 
the risks to that position.58  
In addition to the new EU non-financial disclosure requirements, the Nordic countries have 
been leaders in requiring corporate reporting that is more comprehensive than the reporting 
required by the EU’s 2003 Accounts Modernization Directive.   Since 2008, public companies in 
54 See Part IV, D, infra. 
55 See Beate Sjåfjell & Linn Anker Sørensen, Directors Duties and Corporate Social Responsibility, 25,  in BOARDS 
OF DIRECTORS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES: RESHAPING AND HARMONIZING THEIR ORGANISATION AND DUTIES 
(Hanne Birkmose, Mette Neveille and Karsten Engsig Sørensen, eds. Kluwer Law Int’l 2013/2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2322680. 
56 See Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014, amending Directive 
2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and 
groups, Official Journal of the European Union L330/1-330/9. 
57 See id.  at ¶ 6. 
58  See Beate Sjåfjell & Linn Anker Sørensen, Directors Duties and Corporate Social Responsibility,25,  in BOARDS 
OF DIRECTORS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES: RESHAPING AND HARMONIZING THEIR ORGANISATION AND DUTIES 
(Hanne Birkmose, Mette Neveille and Karsten Engsig Sørensen, eds. Kluwer Law Int’l 2013/2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2322680.  For further discussion of the 2003 Accounts 
Modernization Directive, see Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Triumph or Tragedy? The Curious Path of 
Corporate Disclosure Reform in the UK, 31:2 WILLIAM & MARY ENV. L.J. 317  (2007). 
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Sweden must make a sustainability report consistent with GRI (the Global Reporting 
Initiative).59  Since January 2009, approximately 1,100 large companies in Denmark, as well as 
institutional investors and loan providers, have been required to publish an annual corporate 
responsibility report, following a 2008 government Action Plan on Corporate Responsibility.60  
Companies may use their annual reporting to the U.N. Global Compact as the framework for 
their public disclosure, and institutional investors may report on their incorporation of the 
Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI) developed by the U.N. Environment Program.61    
And as of 1 July 2013, Norwegian companies must report on labor issues, gender equality, anti-
discrimination and environmental issues, including reporting on what they are doing to 
incorporate these issues and human rights concerns into management practices.62 
These examples are indicative of a global trend towards required corporate responsibility 
reporting.  According to a 2015 report by the Initiative for Responsible Investment of the Hauser 
Institute for Civil Society at the Kennedy School, Harvard University, 23 countries have enacted 
legislation within the last 15 years to require public companies to issue reports including 
environmental and/or social information.63 These countries include Argentina, China, Denmark, 
the EU, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland (specific 
to state-supported financial institutions after the 2008 financial crisis), Italy, Japan, Malasia, The 
59 See Jan Bertil Anderson and Frida Segenmark, Sustainable Companies: Barriers and Possibilities in Swedish 
Company Law, Univ. of Oslo Res. Paper No. 2013-09 (April 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2248584.  
60 See Karin Buhmann, Company Law as an Agent for Migration of CR-Related International Law into Company 
Self-Regulation?  The Case of the CR Reporting Requirement, 8:2-3 EUR. COMPANY LAW 65, 68 (2011). 
61  See id.  For more information on the PRI, see United Nations Environment Program Principles for Responsible 
Investment, available at  http://www.unpri.org/about-pri/. 
62 See Sjåfjell & Sørensen, supra note 58, at 26-27. 
63 See Initiative for Responsible Investment, Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Efforts by National 




                                                          
Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the U.K.64 Of these countries, 
France is particularly noteworthy, having been a leader by requiring publicly-listed companies to 
report data on 40 labor and social criteria since 2002, followed by requirements in 2009 for 
companies with more than 500 employees in high-emitting sectors to publish their greenhouse-
gas (GHG) emissions.65   
In addition to these reporting initiatives, seven stock exchanges require social and/or 
environmental disclosure as part of their listing requirements:  Australia’s ASX, Brazil’s 
Bovespa, India’s Securities and Exchange Board, the Bursa Malasia, Oslo’s Børs, the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and the London Stock Exchange.66 Moreover, seven countries 
have enacted policies following those of the U.K. and Sweden, which since 2000 have required 
pension funds to disclose the extent to which the fund incorporates social and environmental 
information into their investment decisions.67  These countries include Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan.68  
Notably missing from any of these lists of comprehensive ESG disclosure is the United 
States, which does have specific disclosure requirements in certain regulatory contexts but no 
general ESG disclosure framework.  Since 1986, the Environmental Protection Agency has 
required facility-by-facility disclosure concerning the release into the environment and/or 
64 See id. 
65 See id., citing the New Economic Regulations Act in France, 2002. 
66 See id. 
67 For a discussion of this requirement in the U.K., and other early social and environmental disclosure requirements, 
see Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way?: The Erosion of the Anglo-American 
Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 (2005)(arguing that differences in the “shareholder 
wealth maximizing” norm between the U.K. and U.S. were substantial enough to cast doubt on the idea of an 
“Anglo-American corporate governance” system). 
68 See Initiative for Responsible Investment report, supra note 63. 
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management through recycling of over 650 chemicals through the Toxic Release Inventory.69  
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires substantial corporate governance 
disclosure from its publicly-listed companies, as do most countries.  Yet, generalized 
requirements for environmental or social disclosure tend to be narrower than those described 
above.   
  Current SEC regulations require disclosure of environmental litigation against any 
government agency where a penalty of $100,000 is sought,70 and the SEC has issued guidance 
for listed companies regarding the extent to which they should disclose climate risks to their 
future profitability, either from physical changes associated with climate change, or from 
regulatory initiatives designed to mitigate climate risk.71     
Four relevant disclosure requirements (with rule-making directives to the SEC) were enacted 
as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, each 
targeting an aspect of a company’s social record: the ratio of the CEO’s total pay to the median 
employee pay;72  mine safety disclosure;73 “conflict minerals” disclosure where tin; tantalum, 
69 See Toxic Release Inventory, available at http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/learn-about-
toxics-release-inventory. 
70 See  Reg. S-K, Instructions to Item 103, No. 5(C), 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2015).  For a discussion of this 
requirement, as well as an analysis of the statutory authority of the SEC to require much more extensive social and 
environmental disclosure, see Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999).    
71 See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Rel. 33-9106, 34-61469 (Feb. 8, 
2010), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf. 
72   See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), § 953(b)(2).  The 
SEC’s proposed rule to implement this provision was published on September 18, 2013 a 3-2 divided vote, but the 
final rule has yet to be promulgated as of April, 2015.  Pay Ratio Disclosure Proposed Rule, Rel. No. 33-9452, 34-
70443 (Sept. 18, 2013), available at  https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2013/33-9452.pdf. 
73 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), § 1503.  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission has implemented this requirement as Item 104 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 
229.104.  This section was added to Dodd-Frank after an explosion in April, 2010, at the Upper Big Branch Mine in 
West Virginia, killed 29 miners.  It soon became clear that Massey Energy, the owner of the mine, had a practice of 
ignoring the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, having received over 1300  notifications of violations 
about that particular mine in the years leading up to the explosion.  Democracy Now, Massey Energy Mine Cited for 
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tungsten or gold from the Democratic Republic of the Congo or neighboring countries were 
incorporated into listed companies’ products; 74 and “publish what you pay” transparency 
disclosure for extractive company payments to host countries.75  These latter two disclosure 
provisions have been challenged in litigation by the National Association of Manufacturers 
(challenging conflict mineral disclosure), and the American Petroleum Institute (challenging 
publish what you pay), joined in both instances by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.   
The SEC’s implementing rule on conflict mineral disclosure, requiring listed companies to 
engage in a due diligence process to determine if their supplies of the named minerals were from 
mines supporting armed rebels or the Congolese army, was generally upheld by the District 
Court76 and Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, with one exception identified 
by the Court of Appeals.77  That exception held that required language in reports to the SEC and 
on a company’s website that minerals “have not been found to be DRC conflict free” where a 
company’s due diligence could not exclude the possibility of conflict minerals in their supply 
chains violated companies’ First Amendment rights.78   This aspect of the Court of Appeals’ 
decision is being further reviewed by the Court of Appeals,79 but the rest of the rule has gone 
into effect, requiring companies to evaluate whether their supplies are conflict free and to report 
on their due diligence procedures, without using the offending required language. 
1300+ Safety Violations in Years Leading up the Deadly Explosion, April 7, 2010, available at 
http://www.demoCRacynow.org/2010/4/7/massey_energy_mine_cited_for_1 
74 See Dodd-Frank, § 1502, enacted as 15 U.S.C. § 13(p). 
75 See Dodd-Frank, § 1504, enacted as 15 U.S.C. § 13(q). 
76 National Association of Manufacturers, Inc. v. SEC, 956 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013).   
77 See National Association of Manufacturers, Inc.  (“NAM”) v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
78 See NAM , 748 F.3d at 372-373. 
79 Soon after the Court of Appeals decision in NAM v. SEC, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit decided another disclosure case, en banc, holding against a similar claim by companies (that required 
country-of-origin disclosure for meat products violated their First Amendment rights), and using a lower level of 
constitutional scrutiny (“rational basis”) than had been applied in the NAM  litigation challenging the conflict 
minerals disclosure.  See American Meat Institute v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,  730 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 
2014)(en banc).   After American Meat Institute the SEC obtained further review of the conflict minerals disclosure, 
and is seeking to persuade the court to uphold its entire rule using the rational basis process of analysis.   
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   The 2012 “publish what you pay” rule promulgated by the SEC in response to Dodd-Frank 
was vacated by the District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit for failing to include any 
exemptions for public disclosure where host countries prohibit it (such as Angola, Cameroon, 
China and Qatar), and for interpreting Dodd-Frank to require public disclosure rather than 
considering disclosure only to the SEC.80  As of March, 2015, the SEC had not reissued the rule. 
Generally, though, there is a clear trend towards an increasing number of environmental and 
social disclosure requirements around the world.  A report by KPMG, UNEP, GRI and the Unit 
for Corporate Governance in Africa that identified individual reporting initiatives in 45 countries 
found 180 such initiatives in 2013, three times the number they had found in 2006.81  Such 
reporting initiatives included ESG/sustainability disclosure frameworks, such as GRI; 
requirements or recommendations for disclosure of individual topics (e.g., GHGs) or addressed 
to specific industries (e.g., mining); or were standards regarding sustainability assurance.  Of 
these 180 reporting initiatives, 72% were mandatory, compared to 58% mandatory in 2006. 
IV.   EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
The trends described above of increasing voluntary corporate ESG disclosure, increasing 
numbers of voluntary corporate responsibility standards and multilateral frameworks, and 
increasing numbers of jurisdictions imposing standards for required ESG disclosure suggest that 
corporate responsibility is becoming important in the institutional and normative frameworks 
shaping companies’ actions.  Notwithstanding these trends, the concept of corporate 
responsibility remains contested from a number of perspectives.  In the following sections, some 
80 See American Petroleum Institute v. SEC, No. 12-1398 (D.D.C. July 2, 2013).  
81 See KPMG, UNEP, Global Reporting Initiative and Unit for Corporate Governance in Africa, Carrots and Sticks: 




                                                          
empirical evidence about these trends in relation to institutions of corporate governance will be 
discussed, followed by a number of critical perspectives. 
Two caveats, however, with regard to this discussion of the interaction of corporate 
responsibility and corporate governance.  The topic of corporate responsibility has been given 
increasing academic attention in the past decades, as this table prepared by Timothy Devinney, 
University Professor of International Business at the University of Leeds, indicates.  This table 
shows the number of published articles on corporate responsibility within various fields, based 
on a database Devinney constructed.     







Environmental Sciences 2 0 2 13 61 
Economics 19 6 9 46 174 
Management 189 149 217 604 1460 
Sociology 14 4 10 105 295 
Psychology 3 0 2 6 17 
Law 23 3 11 50 153 
Source: Timothy M. Devinney’s Database of Articles on Corporate Responsibility82 
The following discussion aims to bring forward a number of the more evocative   
empirical research findings about corporate governance influences on corporate responsibility, 
particularly those with implications for the future of this field.  It clearly does not purport to be a 
comprehensive review of this burgeoning literature.  Second, the empirical literature on 
corporate responsibility is equivocal in many respects, as will be discussed below.  This is 
arguably not terribly different from the equivocal results of corporate governance research 
generally as Ruth Aguilera, Kurt Desender, Michael Bednar and Jun Ho Lee have shown in an 
argument for better understanding the effects of external corporate governance (law, the market 
82  It should be noted that some significant number of articles in psychology, particularly industrial and 
organizational psychology, are published in management journals.   
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for corporate control, external auditors, stakeholder activism, ratings agencies and the media) on 
internal corporate governance and financial results.83  As with corporate governance, equivocal 
empirical results here simply suggest there is more work to be done.  
A.  Corporate Responsibility and Financial Performance 
One of the perennial debates in this field is whether corporate responsibility initiatives lead 
to better firm-level financial performance, the “business case” for corporate responsibility.84   
There are a number of aspects to this debate, but two primary issues have been, first, whether 
corporate responsibility initiatives pay off, or whether instead they are a waste of money and 
evidence of unaddressed agency costs; and second, if financial performance is found to be better 
in firms with robust responsibility initiatives, which way does causation go?  Do better-
performing firms invest in corporate responsibility because they have higher slack resources, or 
do the investments come first and the better financial results follow?   
The research addressing both of these issues has led to a welter of conflicting results, which 
is likely due to three primary factors.  First, the breadth of issues encompassed within 
“corporate responsibility” means different studies are very often looking at different things, 
while using the same generic labels, as Judith Walls, Pascual Berrone and Philip Phan have 
argued in narrowing their own scope of quantitative analysis, as discussed below.85 Moreover, 
there are different mechanisms by which corporate responsibility initiatives may contribute to a 
company’s results, as discussed by Archie Carroll and Kareem Shabama in arguing for a 
83 See Ruth V. Aguilera, Kurt Desender, Michael K. Bednar & Jun Ho Lee, Connecting the Dots: Bringing External 
Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle, ACAD. OF MNGMT. ANNALS 2015.  
84 See Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabama, The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review 
of Concepts, Research and Practice, INT’L J. OF MNGMT. REVS. 85 (2010).         
85 See Judith A. Walls, Pascual Berrone & Philip H. Phan, Corporate Governance and Environmental Performance: 
Is there Really a Link?, 33 STRAT. MNGMT. J. 885, 886 (2012) for further discussion of this point. 
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broader concept of “the business case” for corporate responsibility.86 These differing 
mechanisms, including “business benefits of (1) reducing costs and risks; (2) strengthening 
legitimacy and reputation; (3) building competitive advantage; and (4) creating win-win 
situations through synergistic value creation,”87 would affect results depending on the type of 
corporate responsibility issue and initiative being examined, the size of the firm, the industry, 
and the social and legal context.88       
  Second, there are mediating variables that until recently were not being carefully 
disaggregated.  A widely-cited study by Abagail McWilliams and Donald Siegel from 2000 that 
discusses the equivocal financial results in studies of corporate responsibility is based on this 
point, showing that R&D intensity and advertising intensity of industries explain any significant 
financial out-performance from corporate responsibility, while recognizing close correlations 
between corporate responsibility and R&D and advertising.89  As studies have become more 
sophisticated in identifying the mediating variables, the results are starting to be more consistent 
in showing positive financial results from corporate responsibility. 
      Third, until recently the data were not very good.  Early studies had only a firm’s own 
disclosure to “measure” a firm’s social or environmental performance, and some of that 
disclosure was undoubtedly exaggerated.  Today there are multiple databases collating much 
better quantitative and qualitative sources of information about firms’ actual social and 
environmental performance—such as the data Bloomberg sells to its clients—and the 
misspecification issues are well-known and are being addressed by targeted studies.  As a 
consequence, certain results are emerging that substantiate the early (2003) meta-analytic result 
86 See Carroll & Shabama, supra note 84, at 92. 
87 Id. at 95. 
88 See id. 
89 See Abagail McWilliams and Donald L. Siegel, Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance: 
Correlation or Misspecification?, 21 STRAT. MNGMT. J. 603 (2000).  
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of Marc Orlitzky, Frank Schmidt and Sara Rynes that corporate responsibility investments can 
pay off.90  A number of examples follow.  
In a paper showing superior corporate responsibility performance from companies in 
countries with a Scandinavian legal origin, and then German and French legal origins, and the 
superiority of all three in comparison to the common law countries (results discussed in more 
detail in Section D below), Hao Liang and Luc Renneboog show that better corporate 
responsibility performance also increases firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q.91   This finding 
is consistent with the results of Bob Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou and George Serafeim, who 
demonstrate that companies with a strategic focus on ESG issues show financial outperformance, 
and stock market and accounting value premiums, based on eighteen years’ worth of 
observations of 90 matched pairs of high-sustainability versus low-sustainability companies.92  
As Eccles, Inannou and Serafeim recognize, these are long-term strategies and not consistent 
with short-term market pressures or results.  One can hypothesize that in the United States, 
where short-term activist shareholders are becoming increasingly powerful, corporate 
responsibility initiatives will be under pressure.  More recent work by Serafeim and colleagues 
Mozaffar Khan and Aaron Yoon show that management attention to material sustainability risks 
yields financial outperformance of 3% to 8%, evaluated within industries using specific concepts 
90 This study is a widely-cited (over 3,300 citations to 2015) meta-analysis of 52 prior studies, and it shows better 
financial performance of firms with better environmental and social records, although the magnitudes of the 
financial correlations, while statistically significant, are modest.  See Marc Orlitzky, Frank L. Schmidt, & Sara L. 
Rynes, Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis. 24 ORG. STUD.  403 (2003). 
91 See Hao Liang and Luc Renneboog, , Law and Finance: The Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Tilburg University CentER for Economic Research, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Finance 
Working Paper No. 394/2013 (Jan. 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2360633.   
92 See Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou, & George Serafeim, the Impact of Corporate Sustainability on 
Organizational Processes and Performance, 60:11 MNGMT. SCIENCE 2835 (2014).  
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of industry-relevant materiality being developed in the United States by the Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board (SASB).93  
 If some corporate responsibility initiatives lead to better financial performance, in some 
industries and legal contexts, a follow-on question is why.  Here a number of very recent 
empirical studies show that important mediating variables are innovation and trust.  Companies 
with a longer-term management focus94 or a stakeholder orientation95 promote innovation within 
the firm and higher levels of trust of the firm among various external stakeholders. In one study, 
Caroline Flammer and Aleksandra Kacperczk used a “natural experiment” to demarcate a 
shareholder from a stakeholder orientation of a firm, which was the enactment in various states 
of the United States of  “other constituency” statutes.96  In the law literature, these statutes, 
which give directors the statutory discretion to consider constituents other than shareholders in 
making decisions, particularly decisions to resist takeovers, have generally been interpreted to be 
relatively unimportant, and underutilized, albeit with the potential to create ambiguity regarding 
directors’ duties.97  What Flammer and Kacperczk found, however, based on regressions on 
159,558 firm year observations, is that measures of innovation—the number of patents issued 
and the number of citations to those patents—increased significantly (went up between 6.4% and 
6.8%)  in companies in states that enacted an “other constituency” statute.98   They interpret 
93 See Mozaffar Khan, George Serafeim, & Aaron Yoon, Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality, 
Harvard Business School Working Paper 15-073 (March 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2575912. 
94 See Caroline Flammer & Pratima Bansal, Does Long-Term Orientation Create Value? Evidence from a 
Regression Discontinuity  (2014)  available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2511507 
(showing that firms that adopted longer-term executive compensation plans showed an increase in firm value and 
operating performance after the adoption of those plans). 
95 See Caroline Flammer & Aleksandra Kacperczk, The Impact of Stakeholder Orientation on Innovation: Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2353076.   
96 See id. 
97 See American Bar Association, Other Constituency Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45:4 BUS. LAW. 2253 
(1990). 
98 See id. at 23-24. 
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these results to show that the protections of other constituency statutes allow for greater 
experimentation within the firm, which results in both more “flops” and more “hits” on which 
the firm can get a patent.99    In another study, Flammer and Pratima Bansal found an increase in 
firm value after the firm’s adopted longer-term management compensation plans, and also found 
improved operating performance on each of three metrics (return on assets, net profit margin, 
and sales growth).100  In year one after the firm adopted the longer-term plan, operating 
performance declined, which Flammer and Bansal suggest shows that “increased long-term 
orientation may take some time to materialize into higher profits.”101   Flammer and Bansal’s 
results were mediated by increases in innovation after firm’s adopted a longer-term orientation, 
as measured by increasing investment in R&D; and increases in social capital investments and 
performance (legitimacy, reputation and trust).102  
Empirical results from Jodi Surroca, Josep Tribó and Sandra Waddock support the theory 
that intangibles like innovation are a necessary mediating variable that explain the relationship 
between corporate responsibility and better financial performance.103  Their study shows that 
corporate responsibility strategies and operating procedures positively influence intangibles of 
innovation, human capital improvements, reputation and corporate culture, and that these 
intangibles are significantly related to corporate financial performance.104 If the effects on 
intangibles are statistically “pulled out,” then corporate responsibility performance does not 
99 See id. 
100 See Flammer & Bansal, supra note 93, at 4. 
101 Id. 
102 See id.  Social performance is measured using the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) index of social 
performance.  KLD is a socially-responsible investment fund which has collected an extensive database of 
quantitative and qualitative data since 1991, which data it uses to construct its investment portfolios.  KLD’s data is 
widely used in empirical studies of CSR. 
103 See Jordi Surroca, Josep A. Tribó & Sandra Waddock, Corporate Responsibility and Financial Performance: The 
Role of Intangible Resources, 31 STRAT. MNGMT. J. 463 (2010).   
104 See id.  at 480 
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show significant effects on corporate financial performance.105  These mediating influences are 
stronger in growth industries versus mature industries, and causality is shown in both directions 
in both growth and mature industries: better financial performance supports some of the same 
intangibles and leads to better corporate responsibility performance, and vice versa.106  Taken 
together, Surroca et al. conclude that it is the necessity of the mediating variables that explains 
many of the mixed results of previous investigations of the business case, and explains some of 
the modesty of the Orlitzky et al. results in their 2003 meta-analysis.107   
A comprehensive review in 2014 of empirical studies of the financial results of corporate 
responsibility by Gordon Clark, Andreas Feiner and Michael Viehs found that 90% of studies 
show that sound sustainability standards lower firms’ cost of capital; 80% of studies show that 
the stock price performance of companies is positively influenced by good sustainability 
practices; and 88% of studies show that better E, S, or G practices result in better operational 
performance.108  While the answers are thus becoming clearer on the empirical questions related 
to the business case, it is not fully settled under what conditions corporate responsibility leads to 
better firm performance when it does, or the direction of causality.109  As Devinney put the 
question in 2009: What are the corporate responsibility competencies that can be linked to which 
specific performance outcomes, and through which operational and managerial competencies?110    
B. Board Composition and Committees  
105 See id.  at 482. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See Gordon L. Clark, Andreas Feiner & Michael Viehs, From the Stockholder to the Stakeholder: How 
Sustainability Can Drive Financial Outperformance (2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508281.   This report is an excellent resource because  it 
analyzes the empirical literature on the financial effects of sustainability initiatives by type of initiative (E, S or G) 
and by various financial measures of interest (cost of debt capital; cost of equity capital; operating performance; and 
effect on stock prices).  The study also separately identifies scientifically sound meta-studies and literature reviews.      
109 See Timothy M. Devinney, Is the Socially Responsible Corporation a Myth?  The Good, the Bad and the Ugly of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, ACAD. MNGMT. PERSP. 44 (MAY 2009). 
110 See id.  at 52-53.  
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One structural feature that would seem to indicate a seriousness of purpose about corporate 
responsibility, or at least the potential for a connection between a governance mechanism and 
corporate social performance, would be a board committee dedicated to the topic.  Yet the 
empirical evidence is mixed on this point. Judith Walls, Pascual Berrone and Philip Phan made 
the methodological observation that there are different aspects to a company’s social 
performance, and so the mixed results from empirical studies could be a function of failing to 
untangle competing parameters.111  Moreover, the strategic use of disclosure to manage 
stakeholder relationships may obfuscate performance: the worst environmental performers might 
use the most environmental disclosure to manage public relationships, for instance, while the 
worst social performers (community, labor and supply chain management) might use the least 
social disclosure.112   Since disclosure was used as the evidence for corporate social performance 
in many previous studies, such patterns would produce conflicting—and inaccurate-- results. 
Thus, Walls et al. only evaluated environmental performance (not environmental disclosure) as a 
function of various aspects of governance (size of a company, board structure, ownership, 
executive power and executive compensation).113   
The authors found two noteworthy effects regarding the board.  First, the existence of a 
specialized environmental board committee was related to both better and worse environmental 
performance, suggesting that board committees could be established either to promote better 
environmental performance or as a reaction to environmental problems.114  Second, more 
independent, larger, and less diverse boards were associated with worse environmental 
111 See Judith A. Walls, Pascual Berrone & Philip H. Phan, Corporate Governance and Environmental 
Performance: Is there Really a Link?, 33 STRAT. MNGMT. J. 885, 886 (2012).        
112 Indeed Mallin et al. found suggestions of this kind of strategic use of disclosure, while not exactly that pattern.   
See Christine A. Mallin, Giovanna Michelon & Davide Raggi, Monitoring Intensity and Stakeholders’ Orientation: 
How Does Governance Affect Social and Environmental Disclosure?, 114(1) J. OF BUS. ETHICS 29 (2013). 
113  See Walls et al, supra note 111, at 886.  Walls et al. used environmental performance data that has been collected 
by KLD. 
114 See id.    
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outcomes, possibly because of a lack of in-depth knowledge of environmental risks to the 
company.115  Moreover, an important interaction Walls et al. describe is between a strong CEO 
(having both the role of CEO and Chairman of the Board) and an insider board: companies with 
this configuration have better environmental outcomes than do companies with a split 
CEO/Chair and more independent board.116  As Walls et al. state “This interesting finding 
suggests that powerful CEOs may be important for environmental outcomes, and that the vision 
of such CEOs can be fostered by boards consisting of supportive inside directors.”117  The same 
general pattern was demonstrated by Surroca and Tribò, who found that increased independence 
of the board, split CEO and Chair, and the presence of independent committees reduced 
corporate social performance.  Surroca and Tribò interpreted these results to suggest that 
corporate responsibility is a strategy for management entrenchment and thus indicative of agency 
concerns.118  That is, by establishing stronger ties with internal and external constituents, 
particularly employees and community elites, the top management team insulates themselves 
from the accountability mechanisms of an independent board and Chair.119 
That a dedicated corporate responsibility committee on the board cannot be taken as an 
unambiguous signal of support for the topic is suggested in Table 2, which lists the top 25 
companies in the world, by market capitalization, and some features of their corporate 
governance and responsibility arrangements.   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
115 See id. at 902. 
116 See id. at  
117 See id. at 902. 
118 See Jordi Surroca & Josep A.Tribó, Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance, 35 (5-6) J. OF 
BUS. FIN. & ACCTNG.,  748 (2008). 
119 See id. at 770. 
28 
 
                                                          
From this table we can see both corporate responsibility leaders with dedicated committees 
(Johnson & Johnson; Novartis), as well as those companies in industries that have been subject 
to pointed social criticism (JPMorgan Chase, criticized for its role in the financial crisis; Coca-
Cola for its role in water depletion in India and contributing to obesity generally through its 
products).  Notable as well is that of the top 25 companies in the world, by market capitalization, 
19 of which are from the United States, only one, Berkshire Hathaway, does not have a portion 
of its website dedicated to corporate responsibility or sustainability issues.  Berkshire Hathaway 
may not need such a page, given that its CEO, Warren Buffett, is known for a clear commitment 
to simple guiding principles, such as this one prominently featured on the company’s website:  
Given the variety and complexity of ethical questions that may arise in the Company’s 
course of business, this Code of Business Conduct and Ethics serves only as a rough guide. 
Confronted with ethically ambiguous situations, the Covered Parties should remember the 
Company’s commitment to the highest ethical standards and seek advice from supervisors, 
managers or other appropriate personnel to ensure that all actions they take on behalf of the 
Company honor this commitment. When in doubt, remember Warren Buffett’s rule of thumb: 
 
“...I want employees to ask themselves whether they are willing to have any contemplated act 
appear the next day on the front page of their local paper – to be read by their spouses, 
children and friends– with the reporting done by an informed and critical reporter. 120 
 
But that even Alibaba, a Chinese internet sales company incorporated in the Cayman Islands which 
is being investigated for extensive sales of counterfeit products on its website,121 would include a 
“sustainability” page on its website suggests at least two things: global companies feel pressure 
from social actors to be seen to embrace positive social and environmental values; and companies’ 
disclosure cannot be understood as an unambiguous signal of actual corporate responsibility.  
C.  Patterns of Shareholder Ownership 
120 See Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, available at 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/govern/ethics.pdf.  Unlike every other top company’s website, Berkshire 
Hathaway’s also has no pictures. 
121 See Scott Cendrowski, Nothing to See Here says Alibaba’s Ma—and Customers Seem to Agree, available at 
http://www.fortune.com/2015/02/03/nothing-to-see-here-says-alibabas-ma-and-customers-seem-to-agree (quoting 
one “obsessive” Chinese customer that “of course” there are counterfeit goods being sold on Alibaba’s Chinese 
website, but that there is a difference between “a fake Coach purse and tainted baby food.”). 
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As noted in the introduction to this chapter, there is evidence that some types of institutional 
shareholders are paying more attention to ESG issues, and this is one source of pressure on 
companies to also pay more attention.122  Trillions of dollars of invested capital supporting 
initiatives such as the U.N. Environment Program’s Principles of Responsible Investment or 
backing the Carbon Disclosure Project’s efforts to get better data on company’s management of 
GHG emissions sends a signal to companies that at least some investors care about these topics.  
Of potentially greater significance, since 2009 Bloomberg has included 79 environmental and 
social data points in the information it sells to brokers and dealers throughout the world, as 
indicated in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Following the logic of Robert Daines, Ian Gow and David Larcker, presumably Bloomberg 
would not be collecting, analyzing and selling this information if there was not a market for 
it.123  Bloomberg has only sold these data since 2009, which gives further evidence of corporate 
responsibility as an emerging trend.   
 Richard Johnson and Daniel Greening have shown that the type of investors in a company 
has a significant effect on a company’s environmental and social performance.124  Firms with 
higher percentages of long term, pension fund investors had significantly better performance on 
social issues and environmental issues than firms with lower percentages, although the effect on 
122 See Ruth V. Aguilera, Deborah E. Rupp, Cynthia A. Williams & Joyti Ganapathi, Putting the “S” Back in 
Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multi-Level Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility, 32:3 ACAD. OF MGMT. 
REV. 836 (2007)(discussing various motives for employees, managers, shareholders, customers, NGOs, and 
countries to pressure companies to adopt corporate responsibility initiatives, and theorizing about interactions 
among those entities and motives, and effects on the firm). 
123 See Robert M. Daines, Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, Rating the Ratings: How Good are Corporate 
Governance Ratings, 98 J. FINAN. ECON. 439 (2010)(while finding the quality of corporate governance ratings to be 
suspect given little correlation among the ratings from different providers, the fact that these ratings agencies have a 
commercially-viable business shows that investors value the information).  
124 See Richard A. Johnson & Daniel W. Greening, The Effects of Corporate Governance and Institutional Investor 
Types on Corporate Social Performance, 42:5  ACAD. MNGMT. J. 564 (1999)( using KLD data ).   
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social issues was modest.125  Donald Neubaum and Shaker Zahra replicated these results in 
2006, finding that large (1% holdings) pension fund investors had a significant and positive 
effect on companies’ social and environmental performance, particularly where funds 
coordinated their activism.  Mutual fund and investment bank holdings had a significant and 
negative effect on corporate social performance, but only when these funds engaged in activism, 
not when they were simply passive investors.126  These findings have implications for corporate 
responsibility going forward, as short term shareholder activists become more visible, at least in 
the U.S.127.  Moreover, these findings have broader social welfare implications given the 
emerging research discussed above that shows a long term management perspective fuels 
innovation.128   
D. Corporate Responsibility, Legal Origins and Corporate Governance Systems 
Consistent with what one might predict, empirical evidence shows that both country-level 
sustainability ratings and company-level corporate responsibility ratings are higher in countries 
with a stakeholder-oriented corporate governance system than in countries with a shareholder-
oriented corporate governance system.  One quantitative study using MSCI (Morgan Stanley 
Capital, International) Intangible Value Assessment data, supplemented with specific social and 
environmental data from MSCI’s Risk Metrics, found that: 
“among different legal origins, the English common law—widely believed to be mostly 
shareholder oriented—fosters CSR the least; within the civil law countries, firms of countries 
with German legal origin outperform their French counterparts in terms of ecological and 
environmental policy, but the French legal origin firms outperform German legal origin 
125 See id.  
126 See Donald O. Neubaum & Shaker A. Zahra, Institutional Ownership and Corporate Social Performance: the 
Moderating Effects of Investment Horizon, Activism, and Coordination,  32:1 J. MNGMT. 108 (2006)(using KLD 
data). 
127 See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE L. REV. 489 
(2013)(discussing shareholder activists and the corporate policies they promote).  
128 See  text accompanying notes 93-105, supra. 
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companies in social issues and labor relations.  Companies under the Scandinavian legal 
origin score highest on CSR (and all its subfields).129 
 
The authors of this study, Hao Liang and Luc Renneboog also find from the analysis of country-
level sustainability ratings and financial development that countries with higher financial 
development (which tends to be those with shareholder-oriented corporate governance systems) 
have lower country-level sustainability ratings, including lower environmental responsibility 
ratings, and lower social responsibility and solidarity ratings.130  While the law and finance 
literature has emphasized the greater financialization of countries with a common-law legal 
origin,131 Liang and Renneboog’s results suggest that financialization per se does not occupy the 
field of important social welfare outcomes. 
A similar pattern for the importance of legal origins was found in another empirical study 
using a different data source (Innovest), but examining only differences between the 
Scandinavian legal system, the “civil and German” legal system, and the common law system 
(Great Britain and Ireland) within the EU.132   In that study Céline Gainet again found that 
Scandinavian countries outperformed those based on civil and German law with regard to 
129 See Hao Liang & Luc Renneboog, The Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility, Tilberg Law and 
Economics Center Discussion Paper No. 2013-023, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2371103.  The MSCI 
Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) developed a series of 29 ESG scores from 1999 to 2011 using multiple sources 
of quantitative and qualitative data for the top 1,500 companies in the MSCI World Index, the top 25 companies in 
its emerging markets index, and the top 275 companies by market capitalization for the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 
and the ASX 200.   Liang and Renneboog note that the governance factors within these 29 ESG scores account for 
less than 2% of the weight of the composite ESG score for a company, while the weight of the labor relations, 
industry specific risks in relation to carbon emissions, and environmental opportunity factors add up to 80%.  Id. at 
8.  Liang and Renneboog supplemented the MSCI IVA data with Risk Metrics data on environmental and social 
factors.        
130 See id. at 23. 
131 See Rafael la Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008). 
132 See  Gainet, supra note 4, at 212.  Innovest uses quantitative and qualitative data evaluating 40 aspects of 
company action using 20 sources, attempting to capture actual company performance.  Social metrics include 
governance of social issues, human capital measures, stakeholder capital measures, product and services evaluation, 
and relationships within emerging markets.  For environmental  measures, Innovest examines total EVA (economic 
value added) versus waste, and also five aspects of environmental risk and opportunities: historical liabilities, 
operating risk, sustainability and eco-efficiency risk, material risk, and strategic profit opportunities.  Id. at 202. 
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environmental performance, and that both outperformed countries in the EU with a common law 
origin.133  Gainet found the pattern with respect to social performance to be mixed 
(Scandinavian countries outperformed both civil and common law in one year, but the common 
law countries in Europe, Great Britain and Ireland, outperformed the civil law countries in two 
years.)  These mixed results may have been due to the short time frame (2004 to 2007) over 
which the social performance of the companies was being examined, given data availability, or 
they demonstrate convergence in labor protections at the EU level, as Gainet suggests.134  
These studies give evidence of an important vector by which law structures the corporate 
social relationship, the legal origins vector, which shapes, among other things, a country’s views 
on the proper role of the state in the economy.  Where, as in the common law system, the state’s 
role in the economy is understood to be more limited in addressing economic inequality or 
promoting and protecting labor or environmental interests than among Scandinavian countries or 
those based on civil law legal families, there is more pressure for voluntary corporate 
responsibility initiatives to address these issues, as Matten and Moon have argued.135  The above 
evidence suggests those voluntary initiatives are less effective in promoting social and 
environmental social welfare than are the types of laws and institutional arrangements found in 
the Scandinavian and civil law legal contexts.       
V.  IMPLICATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
Whether attention to corporate responsibility does lead to financial outperformance in some 
cases, and what those cases are, does not settle the “case of corporate responsibility,” for there is 
a much deeper disagreement with which this chapter concludes.  That is the perennial, one might 
133 See id. 
134 See id. at 213. 
135 See id. at 49. 
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say religious,136 debate over the purpose of the firm.  Is it “simply” to produce products and 
services that create economic rents to be distributed to rights’ holders according to pre-existing 
contractual, statutory and (possibly) normative obligations?  (Given that close to 70% of new 
companies ultimately fail, that task cannot be taken as too simple.)137  Or does the firm also have 
a social obligation to minimize harm to people and the natural environment in its pursuits of 
profits, or even a positive duty to promote social welfare beyond its creation of economic rents? 
In corporate governance and law, this debate tracks the competition between a shareholder 
versus stakeholder view of directors’ and officers’ fiduciary obligations.  The literature on each 
side of this debate is so extensive that the following will simply sketch out aspects of the various 
positions that have direct implications for differing views regarding corporate responsibility, and 
then give some indications of why it might be possible, and important, to narrow the gap 
between these seemingly irreconcilable positions. 
A.  Shareholder Primacy  
Milton Friedman’s articulation of firms’ responsibilities is the iconic expression of a 
predominantly economic perspective on the nature of the firm: 
There is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage 
in activities designed to increase profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, 
which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.138 
This statement was part of a New York Times article in which Friedman contributed to a vigorous 
debate that was then on-going within the business community.  Some academics and members of 
the business community in the U.S. had begun to argue that companies had responsibilities to 
136 See id. at 44 
137 See Startup Failure Rate by Industry, available at http://www.statisticbrain.com/startup-failure-by-industry. 
138 See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y.TIMES MAGAZINE 6 
(Sept. 13, 1970). 
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respond to civil rights and anti-war unrest, as well as strategic interests in providing an attractive 
alternative to collectivist social movements like Marxism, socialism and organized labor, by 
paying greater attention to making a positive social contribution.139   Friedman and others taking 
his view responded that the social contribution firms make from running a profitable business, 
employing people, paying taxes and distributing some part of net profits to shareholders is the 
business firm’s positive social contribution.  A concern that later writers in this vein articulated is 
that trying to create additional social benefits beyond those that flow from honest profit-making 
within the confines of law will dilute management’s focus, undermine economic performance, 
and thereby ultimately undermine social welfare.140   
A number of arguments for a narrow view of managers and directors obligations devolve 
from shareholders’ special position in the firm.  One theoretical perspective, the contractarian 
view of the corporation as articulated by Steve Bainbridge (among others), asserts that an 
implicit term of the contract between shareholders and the firm is that the directors and managers 
will act in the shareholders’ best interests, understood as maximizing their wealth.141 A  
pragmatic perspective suggests that given the broad discretion  directors and top managers have 
to run the firm, and  given that in shareholder-oriented corporate governance systems only 
139 See id. (e.g., note Friedman’s statement that “[t]he businessmen believe that they are defending free enterprise 
when they declaim that business is not concerned "merely" with profit but also with promoting desirable "social" 
ends; . . .  In fact they are–or would be if they or anyone else took them seriously–preaching pure and unadulterated 
socialism. Businessmen who talk this way are unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces that have been 
undermining the basis of a free society these past decades.”).  See  Davis, supra note 1, for a delineation of the 
perspectives in that historical debate. 
140 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 442-443  
(2001) (writing that “[t]he point it simply that now, as a consequence of  both logic and experience, there is 
convergence on a consensus that the best means to this end—the pursuit of aggregate social welfare—is to make 
corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests and (at least in direct terms) only to those 
interests.”).   
141 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV.  547 (2003).  There are other theoretical arguments for shareholder primacy, such as those based on a concept 
of shareholders as principals and managers and directors as agents in an agency relationship.  For a critical summary 
of this view see Bratton & Wachter, supra note 127. 
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shareholders’ have direct rights to vote or to sue,142 it is not surprising that firms and their 
managers will act in shareholders’ interests in order to avoid being sued, voted out of office, or 
thrown out of office in a hostile take-over, as recently argued by Leo Strine, Jr., the Chief Justice 
of the Delaware Supreme Court.143    In another recent article, CJ Strine argues that acting in 
shareholders’ interests is not only pragmatic but legally required and so corporate responsibility 
could be a breach of fiduciary duty.144  This argument will be discussed in more detail below. 
From the shareholder-oriented perspective, corporate responsibility is too much 
responsibility to impose on directors.   Advancing social policy goals is the job of government, 
not business.145  In contrast, directors are elected by the shareholders to run the firm in the 
shareholders’ interests.  Balancing other constituents interests’ by making “tradeoffs between the 
welfare of shareholders and that of non-shareholder constituencies”146 is problematic because it 
is inconsistent with the proper exercise of directors’ power to advance shareholders’ interests, 
142 While Canada is often included as a country having a shareholder-oriented corporate governance system, that is 
no longer correct.  Canada permits non-shareholder constituents to bring derivative actions (sue) by statute, and the 
Supreme Court of Canada has twice articulated a stakeholder perspective on the firm and directors’ obligations.  See 
Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (stating at [42] that “[w]e 
accept as an accurate statement of law that in determining whether they are acting with a view to the best interests of 
the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to 
consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the 
environment.”); BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 S.C.R 560( stating at [ ] that “the 
question is whether, in all the circumstances, the directors acted in the best interests of the corporation, having 
regard to all relevant considerations, including, but not confined to, the need to treat affected stakeholders in a fair 
manner, commensurate with the corporation’s duties as a responsible corporate citizen.). 
143 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making it Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235 
(2014), available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2539098.   
144 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and 
Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, (“Dangers of Denial”), University 
of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper no. 15-08, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2576389. 
145 See, e.g., David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979)(directors 
are not well suited to balance competing social policy interests, which is the job of legislators); Daniel R. Fischel, 
The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982)(redress for those concerned about a lack of 
corporate social accountability is through the political process, not through disrupting the “voluntary arrangements 
that private parties have entered into in forming corporations.”). 
146 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Night-Watchman State, 115 COL. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 39, 49 (2015) (briefly summarizing his prior work discussing this concern). 
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and because it risks undermining accountability by allowing directors to act in their own self-
interest while claiming to act in other constituents’ interests.147 
Given this perspective, the importance of the business case is obvious.  If corporate 
responsibility initiatives do not make money for the firm, they fail.  While many other business 
strategies can also fail, such as mergers and acquisitions, where half to two-thirds do not make 
money for the acquiring firm and resulting entity,148 mergers and acquisitions at least aim to 
make money for the firm, and so their legitimacy as a business strategy is not in doubt.  
Corporate responsibility initiatives do not have that legitimacy of motivation, from the critics’ 
perspective (although “strategic corporate responsibility” is intended to be profitable,149 and 
many responsibility initiatives are profitable, as discussed above).150  As a result, in this view, 
corporate responsibility is too strong a concept: it risks economic underperformance, it usurps 
government’s policy roles, and it is beyond the boundaries of directors’ and managers’ legitimate 
exercise of power by seeking to advance non-shareholder interests. 
B.  Stakeholder Theory 
In contrast, to many academic critics of corporate responsibility, it is still too weak a concept.  
There are a number of strands to this thinking, as with the shareholder perspective.  One is 
stakeholder theory, which is the major theoretical competitor to shareholder primacy.  
Stakeholder theory is generally attributed to Ed Freeman,151 although he attributes the idea to “a 
very old tradition that sees business as an integral part of society rather than an institution 
147 See id. 
148 See ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL:  M&A LESSONS THAT RISE ABOVE THE ASHES Ch.1 (2005). 
149 See Porter and Kramer, supra note 23, and McWilliams & Siegel, supra note 24, for examples of strategic 
corporate responsibility. 
150 See text accompany notes 84-108 , supra. 
151 See R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 409 (1994). 
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separate and purely economic in nature.”152  From the perspective of stakeholder theory, 
economic value is created by voluntary relationships among many parties who cooperate to 
create successful businesses.  It is an ethical theory about the values of management in 
relationships with those parties, and also a management theory about how to create and manage 
successful companies.  As Freeman states, “[c]apitalism works because entrepreneurs and 
managers put together and sustain deals or relationships among customers, suppliers, employees, 
financiers, and communities.”153  This theory does not deny that shareholders are important 
stakeholders in the firm, but does reject the view that shareholders’ interests are the only interests 
that managers and directors should consider in managing a successful firm.154       
From a stakeholder perspective, successful companies incorporate and rely upon multiple 
social and natural inputs, such as an educated work-force, the physical infrastructure for the 
production, transportation and distribution of goods, an effective legal system, and natural capital 
inputs of water, air, commodities, and so forth.  Since some significant portion of the inputs of 
corporate success, including financial inputs, have been contributed by parties other than 
shareholders, those parties also have interests to be considered in determining the responsibilities 
of managers and directors and in distributing the outputs of corporate action.  Some, perhaps 
many, of those interests will be protected by contractual or regulatory arrangements, but others 
cannot be specified ex ante, and so must depend on corporate participants to fairly balance 
152 R. Edward Freeman & Jeanne Liedtka, Stakeholder Capitalism and the Value Chain, 15 EUR. MNGMT. J. 286, 
286 (1997).  Freeman and Liedtka attribute stakeholder theory to other writers in management in the 1960s, 
including Eric Rhenman, Igor Ansoff, and Russell Ackoff.  




                                                          
multiple parties’ legitimate claims ex post, as in Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team 
production theory of corporate law.155   
To some stakeholder theorists, corporate responsibility is too modest, given its emphasis on 
disclosure and voluntarism.  Some serious, even extreme, human rights problems persist despite 
corporate responsibility initiatives and expanded ESG disclosure.  Andy Crane has shown that 
“modern slavery” (traditional slavery, bonded labor, human trafficking and forced labor) is 
endemic in some industries (agriculture, mining, extraction, construction, brickmaking, carpet 
weaving, domestic work and sex work); global estimates range from 12 million to 30 million 
people enslaved throughout the world.156  The limits of corporate responsibility can be seen in 
the problem of slavery in the West African cocoa industry.  That problem was widely publicized 
by NGOs, putting pressure on multi-national companies to sign the Harkin/Engel Cocoa Protocol 
in 2001, which specifically directed the industry to self-regulate.157  According to Crane, that 
Protocol has led to “pilot programs” to determine the most effective ways to eliminate the 
slavery, and “a mooted, but much delayed, program for monitoring and enforcement.”158  In 
other words, fourteen years later the problem has not been solved by industry initiatives.   Tragic 
evidence of the insufficiency of long-established voluntary company codes of conduct and 
industry responsibility initiatives continues to accumulate.  The Rana Plaza collapse in 
Bangladesh in 2013, which killed 1,134 people producing clothes for 29 global clothing 
companies,159or Barrick Gold’s settlement of claims in 2015 that its security personnel had raped 
155  Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 248 (2003). 
156 Andrew Crane, Modern Slavery as a Management Practice: Exploring the Conditions and Capabilities for 
Human Exploitation,38 ACAD. MNGMT. REV. 49 (2013) (citing the ILO and academic studies).   
157 See id. at 58. 
158 Id.  
159 See Clean Clothes Campaign, Compensation is Long Overdue, available at 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/ranaplaza.   
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137 women in Papua New Guinea over a period of decades, show some limits to the reach of the 
voluntary approach.  
Moreover, the “business case” may never be strong enough to overcome the economic 
disincentives to invest in higher labor costs or expensive pollution abatement without a 
supportive regulatory framework that creates a level playing field for competition.  Many of the 
business drivers of corporate responsibility depend on consumers being willing to pay more for 
goods produced in socially-responsible fashion, employees being selective about where they will 
work, choosing only the most responsible employers, and investors generally investing and 
disinvesting based on social parameters.160    Jan Wouters and Leen Chanet bring both a moral 
and a pragmatic argument to show the limits of each aspect of this business case.161  As a matter 
of morality they argue that the business case is a means to the end of responsible business 
conduct, not an end in itself, and should be evaluated as such:  “[I]f respect for human rights is 
fundamental to our society, whether or not ensuring such respect would bring economic 
advantages is irrelevant; achieving it remains our final goal.”162 From a pragmatic perspective, 
neither the ethical consumer movement nor socially-responsible investor pressure are strong 
enough to make a demonstrable contribution to the business case without a supportive regulatory 
environment, in their view, such as by requiring fair trade labeling of products at the point of 
purchase, or requiring consistent, comparable ESG disclosure by public companies.163  Olivier 
DeSchutter also argues for the importance of a supportive regulatory framework.164  Using an 
environmental example, he states “for a government, the most direct solution to [advance] 
160 See Aguilera et al., supra note 122, for discussions of each of these factors as drivers for companies adopting 
corporate responsibility initiatives. 
161 See Jan Wouters and Leen Chanet,  Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 NW. J. 
INT’L H. RTS.  262 (2008). 
162 Id. at 267. 
163 See id. at 267-270. 
164 See Olivier DeSchutter, Corporate Social Responsibility European Style, 14 EUR. L. J. 203 (2008). 
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environmentally responsible conduct is simply to let the price of energy go up, to collect high 
fees for waste disposal (calculated according to volume) and to oblige companies to internalise 
the costs of the pollution they create. There would simply be no ground on which to build the 
business case for CSR, if we bracket these public interventions away.”165 
Whether the voluntary “business case” is stronger than these assessments suggest may 
depend on the reputational benefits and risks of corporate responsibility or irresponsibility, and 
the role of the media in amplifying those benefits or risks.  Estimates indicate that 70% to 80% 
of a company’s market value today is based on “intangibles” such as brand reputation, 
intellectual capital and goodwill.166  High-profile tragedies such as the Rana Plaza collapse or the 
Deepwater Horizon explosion cause industry-wide reputational harm and societal (and investor) 
pressures for redress.167  As BP found out after the Deepwater Horizon explosion, a gap between 
a company’s reputation and the company’s actual performance creates the potential for 
“reputational risk,” which may amplify the effects of media coverage of responsibility issues.168  
Apple is an interesting counter-example here, however.  While its reputation may have suffered 
somewhat from a series of critical media coverage in 2010 concerning the harsh conditions under 
which Apple products are produced in China,169 that negative media coverage has not dented 
165 Id. at 221. 
166 See Robet G. Eccles, Scott C. Newquist, & Roland Schatz, Reputation and its Risks, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 
2007), available at https://hbr.org/2007/02/reputation-and-its-risks. 
167  See Clark, Feiner & Viehs, supra note 108, at 14, indicating that after the Deepwater Horizon tragedy BP stock 
lost 50% of its value, and the oil majors generally lost 18.5%.  Five years later, BP’s share price is still 
underperforming its peer group by about 37%.  See id. 
168 See Eccles et al., supra note 166, discussing how BP’s “Beyond Petroleum” public relations campaign and 
widely-reported research projects on solar power led to greater disillusion among consumers after the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion. 
169 See Richard Bilton, Apple  Failing to Protect Chinese Factory Workers, BBC Panorama (Dec. 18, 2014), 
describing a BBC Documentary airing in December, 2014, in which a number of BBC reporters got jobs in a 
Foxconn factory working on Apple products, and reported on conditions of their work and lives there.     
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Apple’s position as the world’s largest company by market capitalization.170   This disconnect 
between media coverage of a social responsibility issue and consumer reactions was 
encapsulated brilliantly in the title of an article that empirically studied the limits of the business 
case, at least insofar as it depended on ethical consumption: “Sweatshop Labor is Wrong Unless 
the Shoes are Cute.”171    
Another criticism builds on assertions about the strategic use of the business case as an 
argument for voluntary corporate responsibility rather than regulatory intervention.  From this 
perspective corporate responsibility is a business strategy employed specifically to resist 
regulation, thus undermining the ability of society to cause companies to limit and then 
internalize negative externalities.  Ronen Shamir has argued that companies have “constructed” 
the field of corporate responsibility through teaching in business schools, through lobbying, and 
through litigation, as “an essentially voluntary and non-enforceable domain” in order to “resist 
the legalization of their social duties.”172    He has also argued that “through a set of social 
events, workshops and public ceremonies,” businesses “shape notions such as “social 
responsibility” and “social change” in ways that are amenable to business and employers’ 
concerns,” thus “preventing the use of law as a means for bringing greater social 
responsibility.”173   His interpretation is supported by an historical analysis by Rami Kaplan, in 
170 See Table 2, supra, showing Apple’s market capitalization at $752 billion as of March, 2014, twice as large as the 
next largest company, Exxon Mobil ($ 369 billion).  
171 See Neeru Paharia, Kathleen Vohs, & Rohit Deshpandé, Sweatshop Labor is Wrong Unless the Shoes are Cute: 
Cognition Can Both Help and Hurt Moral Motivated Reasoning, 121 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 
81 (2013). 
172 See  Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested Concept of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635 (2004).    
173 Shamir, supra note 14, at 676.  
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which Kaplan argues that “corporate responsibility was devised [in the 1950’s] by the corporate 
capitalist elite, broadly defined, as an instrument for pre-empting governmental intervention.”174   
Thus, from both the stakeholder and the sociological perspective corporate responsibility is 
too weak, and yet too strong.  It is an insufficient constraint on how companies do business in a 
world of accelerating pressures on natural capital and ill-distributed opportunities for human 
flourishing.  Yet, at the same time it is effectively undermining the conditions for putting more 
substantive regulation in place. 
C.  Evaluating the Arguments 
By 2015, the argument that corporate responsibility requires companies and the board to take 
on an essentially political role for which they are ill-suited rings hollow, given the extensive 
involvement of American companies in law-making, lobbying, litigation to narrow regulation, 
and constitutionally-protected electoral politics.175  But two arguments for shareholder primacy 
that are advanced in the U.S. law literature remain important to address: the idea that balancing 
multiple stakeholders’ interests will undermine accountability and allow directors and managers 
too much discretion to act in their own self-interest; and the argument that it is legally required 
for boards and managers to act in the interests of shareholders, and shareholders only, such that 
corporate responsibility initiatives could be a breach of fiduciary duty.   This Author will address 
174 See  Rami Kaplan, “Who has been regulating whom, business or society? The mid-20th-century 
institutionalization of ‘corporate responsibility,’ SOCIO-ECONOMIC REV. 1 (2014). 
175 See Cynthia A. Williams and John M. Conley, Trends in the Social [Ir]responsibility of American Multinational 
Corporations: Increased Power, Diminished Accountability,  25 FORDHAM ENVIR. L. REV. 46 (2013)(discussing 
these trends, and including discussions of  Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310 (2010), 
which expanded corporations’ and unions’ First Amendment rights regarding electoral participation, and Royal 
Dutch Shell v. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), which narrowed the potential Alien Torts Claims Act accountability 
of multinational corporations).  
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the second argument first, because if shareholder primacy is required by law, that ends the 
discussion, at least in the United States.    
Two points that are relevant to both issues are given insufficient attention in the law 
literature, though, and so will be highlighted in advance.  First, the data do not support the view 
that corporate responsibility initiatives inevitably cause financial losses; in fact, to the contrary.   
In an overwhelming majority of cases there is no trade-off between a company’s financial health 
and actions that arise from a broad concept of social obligation, as the studies evaluated by 
Clark, Feiner, and Viehs show.176  The management literature is much more sophisticated on this 
point than is the law literature.  Second, many of the arguments in the law literature against 
corporate responsibility ignore what large companies are saying they are doing, around the 
world.  As set out above, 93% of the world’s largest companies discuss their environmental and 
social initiatives, many in great detail, and many including substantiated, audited data about the 
effects of those initiatives.177  Unless one considers everything that a company says about its 
social responsibilities to be unsubstantiated public relations, then it should be incumbent upon 
judges and law professors who write about these matters to consider these facts in their analyses. 
1.    Shareholder versus stakeholder theory 
The proper understanding of the implications of corporate boards’ legal obligations for 
issues of corporate responsibility has become a matter of vigorous debate again in the United 
States, inspired by Prof. Lynn Stout’s short, sharply-critical book, written for a popular audience, 
entitled “The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, 
176 See text accompanying notes  84-108 , supra.   See also Clark, Feiner and Viehs, supra note 108.  
177 See text accompany note s 5-6, supra. 
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Corporations and the Public.”178  That book has inspired multiple, equally critical reactions by 
respected scholars,179 including a number from CJ Strine.180  CJ Strine recognizes that “directors 
are generally empowered to manage the corporation in a way that is not dictated by what will 
best maximize the corporation’s current stock price,”181 but argues that “advocates for corporate 
social responsibility” make a more fundamental claim, and “pretend that directors do not have to 
make stockholder welfare the sole end of corporate governance within the limits of their legal 
discretion.”182  He rejects the argument of “these well-meaning commentators” that “the business 
judgment rule is cloaking a system of law giving directors the ability to act for any reason they 
deem appropriate.”183  Evaluating the arguments in this debate can provide the context for a 
number of observations regarding shareholder primacy, stakeholder theory, and corporate 
responsibility.  
First, it is inaccurate to argue that shareholders have no special place in corporate law in 
Delaware and in the United States generally.  They clearly do.  Shareholders are the only group 
entitled to vote for the board and to approve important corporate transactions, although creditors 
can also exert control rights through their contracts; shareholders are the only group with rights 
to bring suit derivatively on behalf of the corporation; and the board’s fiduciary duties run “to the 
178 LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, 
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2010).  Professor Stout has been a prolific critic of shareholder primacy in the law 
literature from economic and legal perspectives, but it is her short popular book that seems to have inspired this 
iteration of the corporate responsibility debate.  See, e.g. Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder 
Primacy, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 2003 (2013);  Blair & Stout, supra note 155 (the team production theory of boards’ 
responsibilities). 
179 See, e.g, Jonathan Macey, Sublime Myths: An Essay in Honor of the Shareholder Value Myth and the Tooth 
Fairy, 91 TEX. L. REV. 911 (2013) (critically reviewing The Shareholder Value Myth).   
180 See Strine, supra notes 143 and 144. 
181 Strine, Dangers of Denial, supra note 144, at 4. 
182 Id. at 3. 
183 Id. at 7. 
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corporation and its shareholders.”184   These legal rights matter and should not be treated as 
unimportant, as Prof. Stout’s arguments can sometimes seem to do. 
Yet, as just stated, the Delaware Supreme Court has in a number of cases articulated the 
fiduciary duties of directors as advancing the interests of “the corporation and its shareholders.”   
When these interests conflict, the Court has upheld board actions that frustrate shareholders’ 
short-term financial interests in favor of the board’s well-considered views about the company’s 
longer-term strategies and prospects (as CJ Strine recognizes but does not discuss in any 
detail).185  In Paramount Communications v. Time, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the 
directors’ power to reject the shareholders’ views and take defensive measures against a well-
above-market tender offer.186  While it might be argued that this simply reflects the authority 
structure of Delaware corporate law, since it is the directors and not the shareholders who have 
the statutory power to manage the company,187 the Time board’s actions were demonstrably not 
shareholder wealth maximizing.  If fiduciary principles required shareholder wealth maximizing 
in general, the directors’ actions in Paramount v. Time would not have been upheld. 
There is one circumstance where shareholders’ wealth must be maximized, and that is 
where the shareholders are being cashed out, as in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc.188 In that circumstance, “the duty of the board . . . change[s] from the preservation 
184 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)(board’s obligation is to act in “the best 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders”);  Paramount Communications v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 
1989)(same). 
185 See id. at 4 (stating that “To the extent that these commentators argue that directors are generally empowered to 
manage the corporation in a way that is not dictated by what will best maximize the corporation’s current stock 
price, they are correct,” citing Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989) and Air 
Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 112 (Del. Ch. 2011).).   
186 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989). 
187  As Bob Joffe, the Cravath lawyer who represented Time in the oral argument before the Delaware Supreme 
Court, put the point, “Your Honor, Delaware law does not require that every important corporate decision be put to a   
shareholder plebiscite or referendum.”  
188 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
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[of the company] as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for 
the stockholders’ benefit.”189   Revlon duties have also been found where the control structure of 
a company is being changed, such as where a publicly-held company with dispersed shareholders 
is being pursued by a company with a controlling shareholder, and will become a controlled 
company if the transaction goes forward.  Paramount v. QVC was such a case.190 But these are 
the only circumstances where the board’s obligation is to maximize share value, according to the 
Delaware Supreme Court.   Moreover, shareholder pressure cannot put a company into Revlon 
mode; that determination is reserved to the board.191 
 A former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Norman Veasey, has interpreted 
these precedents as follows: 
[I]t is important to keep in mind the precise content of this “best interests” [of the 
corporate entity] concept—that is, to whom this duty is owed and when. Naturally, one 
often thinks that directors owe this duty to both the corporation and the stockholders.  
That formulation is harmless in most instances because of the confluence of interests, in 
that what is good for the corporate entity is usually derivatively good for the 
stockholders.  There are times, of course, when the focus is directly on the interests of 
stockholders [citing Revlon  and  Paramount Comms. v. QVC].  But, in general, the 
directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, not to the stockholders.”192 
 Moreover, as Prof. Stout and others emphasize, the protection of the business judgment 
rule allows directors to make decisions that are in the longer-term interests of the corporation, 
such as investing in research and development, building new plants, or paying employees well, 
notwithstanding some shareholders who would rather have the company’s money spent on 
189 Id. at 182. 
190 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)(holding that Revlon duties are triggered by a change in control or a break-up of the 
company). 
191  Chancellor Chandler made this point in discussing the evolution of the Paramount standard in Air Products and 
Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 102 (Del. Ch. 2011).   
192 E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. DiGuglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance 
from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1399, 1431 (2005). 
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them.193  As a practical matter, there is going to be no liability for a board that frustrates some 
shareholders’ short-term interests and decides to pay its employees more than the minimum 
wage, for instance, or reduces the prices its products could be sold for so that more employees 
can buy the product—the latter of which the board of the Ford Motor Company did in 1915, 
which decision was upheld by the Michigan Supreme Court in Dodge v. Ford,194 and the former 
as Walmart just did in 2015.195  This argument about the business judgment rule frustrates CJ 
Strine and Prof. Bainbridge, among others, but Prof. Stout (and others) are correct that this is 
193 See Stout, supra note 178, at 2, 24-46.   Other scholars have made this argument about the power of the business 
judgment rule as well.  See, e.g.,Lynne Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of 
Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363 (2002);  Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80  
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733, 770-772 (2005). 
194 In Dodge v. Ford, 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919), the Michigan Supreme Court stated that “there should 
be no confusion (of which there is evidence) of the duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders 
owe to the general public and the duties which in law he and his co-directors owe to protesting, minority 
stockholders.  A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.” 170 
N.W. at 683.  This is the oft-quoted language from this opinion.   It is, however, dicta.  What is often not discussed 
is that the Michigan Supreme Court refused to enjoin the Ford Motor Company’s plans to increase production and 
reduce the cost of its cars, in part so that more of its employees could buy the cars.  The Dodge Brothers had argued 
that Henry Ford wanted to expand production and cut costs “not for the good of the company but to give more 
employment” and to allow more people to buy the cars.  Id. at 678.  Because of the business judgment rule, the 
Court refused to find that Henry Ford’s plan was legally impermissible, and so it did not enjoin the company’s 
actions, as had been requested., stating that”[t] he judges are not business experts.”  Id. at 684.    It did order a higher 
dividend to be paid because it found that the company could expand production, cut the costs of cars, and engage in 
some of its plans for vertical integration and still have substantial assets available from which to pay dividends.   
Thus, the opinion can support either CJ Stine or Prof. Stout’s views.  That is, there is great latitude for company 
directors to act to promote the welfare of their employees, the communities in which they operate, their customers 
and suppliers, or even the environment (Stout’s view), but only so long as there is a plausible justification for how 
that advances the company’s long-term financial well-being (Strine’s view).    
195 See Doug McMillon, CEO Walmart, In Letter to Associates Walmart CEO Doug McMillon Announces Higher 
Pay, Feb. 19, 2015, available at http://blog.walmart.com/in-letter-to-associates-walmart-ceo-doug-mcmillon-
announces-higher-pay.  In the letter, McMillon states that “today, we’re announcing a series of important changes 
that demonstrate our commitment to you, our associates” because the CEO concluded that “it’s clear to me that one 
of our highest priorities must be to invest more in our people this year.”    There is no discussion of this decision 
being anything other than employee-focused.  CJ Strine might consider this a “confession case,” and by his logic, “if 
a fiduciary admits that he is treating an interest other than stockholder wealth as an end in itself, rather than an 
instrument to stockholder wealth, he is committing  breach of fiduciary duty.”  Strine, Dangers of Denial, supra note 
144, at 20.  It is unlikely that the shareholders of Walmart would prevail in a suit based on that theory, though, given 
the business judgment rule, and given the likely positive effects of a decision like this one on employees’ 
“citizenship behavior,” which presumably translates into positive financial outcomes.  See  Russell Cropanzano, 
Deborah Rupp,  Carolyn  Mohler, & Marshall Schminke, Three Roads to Organizational Justice’, in 20 RESEARCH 
PERSONNEL AND HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. 1 – 113 (2001)(discussing three decades of literature in organizational 
psychology showing that employees who perceive that they are being treated fairly are more productive, more 
engaged in the company, have lower absentee rates and stay longer in the job).      
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how the law operates.196  CJ Strine is undoubtedly correct that there could be problems if a board 
makes a social or environmental decision where there is no conceivable long-term benefit to the 
company and thus the shareholders, but in today’s world it is hard to imagine what such a 
decision would be, given social expectations that companies will be responsible citizens and the 
reputational implications of frustrating those expectations.  It is much more likely that a 
managerialist decision would create problems, such as a company giving a retiring CEO an 
apartment in New York, maid service and fresh flowers for life, which raises duty of loyalty 
concerns not implicated by corporate responsibility.197 
Thus, the  law—at least as decided by the Delaware Supreme Court—does not yet require 
shareholder wealth maximizing as the standard of conduct in order for boards to meet their 
fiduciary obligations, except in the circumstances described as being in “Revlon mode.”   
Consistent with CJ Veasey’s view, we can conclude that shareholders are important beneficiaries 
of fiduciary obligations in Delaware, of course, but only so long as their interests and the 
corporation’s long-term interests are in harmony.  Corporate responsibility initiatives are one 
type of strategy to promote the corporation’s long-term financial well-being, as the empirical 
evidence shows, and thus there is no fiduciary breach.   
But, even if lawful, is a multi-stakeholder focus going to mask officers’ and directors’ 
self-interest, and thereby undermine accountability, as has been argued?198  Both on the question 
of self-interest, and on accountability, the prioritizing of shareholders’ interests as it has been 
196 See Strine, Dangers of Denial, supra note 144, at fn. 72, discussing Bainbridge view that this latitude is an 
“unintended consequence” of the business judgment rule.  
197 GE’s Jack Welch was forced to give up $2.5 million per year in retirement benefits of exactly this kind—use of 
an $11 million company apartment in NY for life, maid service, weekly fresh flowers and wine delivery, dry 
cleaning—when the benefits were disclosed by his second wife in a contested divorce proceeding.  SeeMatt Murray, 
Rachel Emma Silverman & Carol Hymowitz, GE’s Jack Welch Meets Match in Divorce Court, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
27, 2002), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1038347809827912908.   
198 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 146. 
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instantiated in the U.S. over the last three decades has itself masked self-interest and created new 
agency problems.   Regarding self-interest, as Lynne Dallas argued over a decade ago, “[a] ‘new’ 
managerialism has arisen that consists of short-term decision making and window dressing to 
impress the stock market at the expense of improving underlying corporation value.”199  In 
particular the shift to stock option compensation “provides unique opportunities for managerial 
self-dealing. . . .”200 By 2015, the tight coupling of managers and markets has allowed 
managerial rent extraction in the U.S. to an historically unprecedented degree.201    
With respect to accountability, we are back to the question of accountability to whom or 
what, and here the Delaware precedents provide a clear answer: accountability must be to the 
corporation and its shareholders, taking a long-term perspective on corporate well-being. Yet 
today’s concern is that shareholders are putting short-term pressure on companies in ways that 
are unproductive for the future success of the corporate enterprise.202  Activist investors exert a 
significant part of this pressure, and an empirical debate is raging over their economic 
influence.203  But in terms of their influence on corporate decisions, Bill Bratton and Michael 
Wachter show that activist investors seek one of four things: that more money be given back to 
shareholders, in the form of share buy-backs or special dividends; that the company sell itself or 
199 Dallas, supra note 193, at 1363. 
200 Id. at 1377. 
201  Both Chrystia Freeland and Thomas Piketty provide statistics on this point, and both identify executive 
compensation systems in the U.S. as contributing significantly to rapidly increasing economic inequality in the U.S.  
CHRYSTIA FREELAND, PLUTOCRATS: THE RISE OF THE NEW GLOBAL SUPER-RICH AND THE FALL OF EVERYONE ELSE 
211-222 (2012); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY  294-303; 330-335; 505-515 (2014). 
202 See Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long Term Shareholders,  124 YALE L. J. 1554 
(2015)(arguing that companies that repurchase or sell large volumes of their own shares can manipulate the stock 
prices, which undermines (in the case of repurchases) putting corporate money to more productive use).   
203 See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism:  Evidence and Implications, 
Columbia University Law and Economics Working Paper No. 489, available at. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2496518 (finding evidence on most important questions 
regarding hedge fund activism ambiguous). 
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its premium assets; that the company increase leverage, or that the company cut costs.204  Some 
of the actions to cut costs might be productive, such as finding ways to save energy or use fewer 
physical inputs.  Others destroy longer-term value, such as putting off needed maintenance of 
plant and equipment, delaying marketing campaigns, cutting back on research and 
development,205 or even engaging in financial reporting fraud or value-destroying mergers and 
acquisitions, a concern identified by none other than Michael Jensen.206    
In 2014, S&P 500 companies spent 95% of their earnings on share buybacks and 
dividends, and they look set to spend over 100% in 2015.207  This level of share buybacks is so 
high that Larry Fink, head of the world’s largest asset manager, Blackrock, has written to all of 
the CEOs in the S&P 500, expressing concerns that corporate leaders are meeting activists’ 
short-term pressures while “underinvesting in innovation, skilled workforces or essential capital 
expenditures necessary to sustain long-term growth.”208   One can argue that giving money back 
to shareholders is exactly what companies should be doing if they have no positive net present 
value investments to make.  But it is bizarre to think that American companies, with their 
incredible confidence, creativity and organizational capacity, cannot find better, more productive 
uses of all of their earnings than giving them back to shareholders (with the not incidental benefit 
of keeping stock prices high and fueling a stock market rally),209 particularly in light of the 
enormous technical challenges facing the world from climate change, which scientists tell us 
204 See William B. Bratton & Michael Wachter, supra note 127, at 508, 513.  See generally William B. Bratton & 
Michael Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 653 (2010). 
205 See J.R. Graham, C.R. Harvey & S. Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting,  
40:1 J. of Accounting and Economics (Dec. 2005).  
206 See Michael Jensen, The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34:1 FINAN. MNGMT. 5-19 (2005).  
207 See Edward Luce, US Share Buybacks Loot the Future, FINAN. TIMES (April 26, 2015), available at 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1aaac576-e9bb-11e4-a687-00144feab7de.html#axzz3ZJldjIW1. 
208 Id. quoting Larry Fink. 
209 See Lu Wang & Callie Bost, S&P Companies Spend Almost All Profits on Buybacks, Bloomberg (Oct. 6, 2014) 
(stating that “buybacks have helped fuel one of the strongest rallies of the past 50 years as stocks with the most 
repurchases gained more than 300 percent since March 2009”). 
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requires a rapid transition to a low-carbon economy.  A more productive system would 
encourage managers and directors to manage their companies well and fairly for the longer-term, 
which will benefit tomorrow’s shareholders in addition to today’s, but which will also give 
management greater latitude to pursue the positive implications of fair employment policies, 
high-quality research and product development, good relationships with suppliers, and careful 
approaches to natural capital.  In stylized form, that is what we see in stakeholder economies 
such as Scandinavia, the Netherlands, France, Germany or Austria, albeit under pressure, and 
that is what three-quarters of senior executives globally say they would want to see for their 
companies.210      
2. Corporate Responsibility Reconciliation 
This chapter will conclude by trying to reconcile competing views of corporate responsibility 
as simultaneously too strong and too weak, assuming differing views of managers’ and directors’ 
obligations from shareholder and stakeholder perspectives, but rejecting the view that corporate 
responsibility is somehow inconsistent with boards’ fiduciary duties even in a shareholder 
system.  Even Friedman believed that business has an obligation to conform “to the basic rules of 
the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.”211  Economic 
theory recognizes negative externalities as one type of market failure justifying regulation.  Each 
of the shareholder partisans quoted above thought that policies to address serious social problems 
should be developed through laws passed by democratic political processes, not by decisions of 
210 See Jonathan Bailey and Jonathan Godsall, Short-Termism: Insights from Business Leaders, McKinsey & 
Company and CPPIB (Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board), Dec. 26, 2013 (findings from a global survey of 
1,038 C-suite executives or board members, indicating that 79 percent felt pressure to deliver financial results in 2 
years or less, even though 73 percent thought a reasonable strategic planning horizon should be at least 3 years).  
McKinsey and CPPIB are co-founders of Focusing Capital on the Long Term, which is described as “a collaborative 
initiative that is developing practical tools and approaches to help institutional investors and corporate directors 
enhance long-term value creation.  See www.FCLT.org.     
211 See Friedman, supra note 138 , at 6. 
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private companies’ boards of directors.212  Looking at the self-regulatory initiatives that 
businesses have participated in can be used as a framework to determine which issues are 
broadly seen to demand regulatory solutions.  At least in theory, the need for more hard law 
regulating social responsibility issues should be a point of agreement between those who 
consider corporate responsibility too strong when devolved to corporate boards for decision, and 
those who consider it too weak because it is voluntary and predominantly process based by 
emphasizing disclosure.    
As both DeShutter and Wouters and Chanet argue, there is a range of regulatory approaches 
that can be used to produce a facilitative framework that permits voluntary initiatives to be more 
effective.  In today’s world, creative regulatory and voluntary approaches to the negative 
externalities of human rights abuses, labor exploitation, climate change and declining natural 
resources (including, most critically, water) are both hypothesized and in place in some parts of 
the world, but in need of serious scaling up to meet the full scope of global challenges.  These 
approaches can be canvassed for best practices and further learning.  Moreover, the accounting 
industry has developed and is continuing to develop approaches to integrated financial and non-
financial reporting, and true-value accounting to incorporate the cost of negative externalities.213  
Implementing  intellectually-justified integrated reporting and accounting systems could go a 
long way towards providing the information and prices necessary to support capital and products 
markets that actually work the way market theories suggest they should work, including fully 
internalizing in the prices of products the social costs of producing and using those products.  
Beyond such strategies, the voluntary initiatives that companies have adopted to date in just 
212 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 138; Fishel and Engel, supra note 145. 
213 See, for instance, KPMG International, A New Vision of Value: Connecting corporate and societal value creation 
(2014), available at http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/press-
releases/pages/corporate-societal-value-creation.aspx; INTEGRATED REPORTING <IR>,  http://www.theiirc.org/. 
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about every industry provide important information about what companies consider feasible.  
They also provide sources of empirical data about the effects of voluntary initiatives as a way to 
evaluate what more is needed to address particular social and environmental issues in each 
industry.  If additional substantive regulation is needed to advance sustainability goals, 
Scandinavian legal and corporate governance approaches may be the most logical place to start 
to find models that work, at least as a good first approximation. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this author will offer the following anecdote.  At a conference in Berlin on 
corporate responsibility four years ago, funded by the German government and held with some 
fair degree of pomp and circumstance in the German Parliament Offices Building, Dirk Matten, a 
leading management academic, described the importance of corporate responsibility with the 
following analogy.  Having been told once by Jeremy Moon that of all the things that do not cure 
a cold, whiskey is the nicest, Matten said that his thinking on corporate responsibility is similar: 
that of all the things that won’t cure contemporary capitalism, corporate responsibility is the 
nicest.  At the least, in his view, it doesn’t make the problems worse.   
This chapter concludes by agreeing with Matten’s assessment, with one important caveat.  
Corporate responsibility initiatives have likely improved the conditions of employment for at 
least hundreds of thousands of people around the world who would otherwise be subject to the 
mandates of unrestrained globalization.  It certainly brings more attention to the environmental 
problems and opportunities of many productive processes and industries, and has thus motivated 
companies to develop innovative products and solutions to address those problems.  It gives 
latitude to people who want to be change agents within organizations, and promotes deeper 
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thinking among people and teams in organizations about the effects of the investments, products, 
services and relationships they are developing.  As the empirical evidence is starting to show, it 
can even be a smart business strategy.   
Corporate responsibility does not fundamentally change underlying power relationships 
between companies and citizens, however, since companies are volunteering to act to address 
social and environmental problems—or not.  It might dissuade governments from regulating, 
though, and in that sense is making problems worse.  It leaves gaping holes, such as its failure to 
establish “no go” zones.  We will no doubt see “responsible tar sands mining” before the decade 
is out, which would be an intellectually-bankrupt concept and a tragic development for the 
stability of the climate.   And as economic development proceeds apace throughout the world, 
improving millions of peoples’ standard of living, there are still billions of people living on the 
equivalent of $2 dollars a day or less.  While those billions of people may surely benefit from 
greater access to productive enterprise, the underlying normative and material conditions of that 
access matter greatly.  So, to the extent that we actually want to solve any of the underlying 
global problems of modern capitalism, stronger medicines than the pleasant whiskey of corporate 
responsibility are required.  
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